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Abstract. This paper focuses on some aspects of the problem of application for 
rating induced by regulators. First, are reviewed, without limitation, some of the most 
significant examples of regulatory abdication in favor of the rating agencies. Second, there 
are some problems found during the recent financial crisis affecting the market of services 
provided by rating agencies. Then, are briefly described the main reactions to the 
shortcomings of legislators and regulators and rating agencies that the crisis has 
highlighted. 
 




At the global level, and individual European countries, a number of rules in 
financial markets rely on opinions of rating agencies to regulate banks and other 
financial intermediaries, including on key issues such as capital requirements. In this 
way, and created an artificial demand for the service rating, have amplified the 
effects of imperfections that characterize it, we laid the premises, with the regulation 
of rating agencies, for the erection of barriers to entry this market and has increased 
the gap between the actual and the utility perceived usefulness of ratings by 
investors. After pointing out how the reactions of legislators, regulators and rating 
agencies, as appropriate, do not appear in themselves capable to solve the real issues 
behind these deficiencies, surgery carries some considerations about the possibility 
of a deeper rethink the relationship between rating and financial regulation. 
 
THE SECOND BASEL AGREEMENT 
One of the most prominent examples of regulatory expectations on ratings 
and represented by so-called "Basel II" on banks' capital requirements. The 
agreement itself limited to internationally active banks but has been extended by 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, including institutions operating on a 
national basis. The Basel 2 agreement, as well as the provisions that have 
incorporated the contents, the standard indicates that banks must meet to address 
three major risks associated with its operations: operational risk, credit risk - 
including risk of counterparts - and the market risk.  
In this context, the ratings are used to quantify the coverage in terms of 
equity, demand in the face of exposure to credit risk. Basel 2 requires banks to 
determine the needed coverage using one of three methods for assessment of credit 
risk: the standard method, the method of internal ratings "Basic" (so-called 
Foundation IRB) and the IRB advanced (cd Advanced IRB). The use of ratings 
provided by entities external to the bank mainly provides for a standard method 
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adopted by banks are not able to take internally sophisticated assessment tools for 
determining the probability of default of the borrower's credit. The standard method 
associated with each rating class a weighting factor for the coverage needed (for 
example, for corporate receivables, from 20% to 150% for AAA rated below BB-). 
A significant exception to the possibility of using internal rating consists of 
the exposures arising from securitization (for example, CDOs or ABS). For 
securitizations, in fact, banks using the IRB approach (basic or advanced) must 
make use of ratings, if any, which accompanies the issuance of securities. The 
financial crisis has shown, however, weaknesses in the assignment of credit ratings 
for securities issued by corporate vehicles in the securitization: a very significant 
amount of financial instruments that qualified for an AAA rating has been 
downgraded, even firm, since June 2007. 
SOME EXAMPLES OF USE OF RATINGS FOR REGULATORY 
PURPOSES. In Europe, another example of reliance on ratings by the legislature is 
represented by the directive on c.d. eligible assets held by mutual funds harmonized, 
if not traded on regulated markets, money market instruments may be subject to 
investment only if the issuer does not belong to the countries of the Group of 10, has 
an investment grade rating (Directive 2009/56/EC; Art. 6 Directive 2007/16/EC ). 
In Europe, even after the recent financial crisis, CESR (The Committee of 
European Securities Regulators) renewed its confidence in the rating with the 
guidelines concerning the funds approved in May 2010. They stipulate that these 
funds may invest only in securities with high rating: it requires a judgment at least 
equal to the second highest level in the scale of assessment of each agency that has 
been expressed on that title. The assessment may be lower, at least to investment 
grade, only for government securities of euro area (CESR, 2010). The technical rule 
that characterizes all of these rules is largely inspired by a regulatory approach born 
of the United States. In that system, regulators have begun to assign ratings to 
effective regulation even after the crisis of '29.  
The first examples of such regulation have occurred just in the banking 
sector by the Comptroller of the Currency: some rules imposed advantages to those 
who purchase securities investment grade, or even prohibited in some cases without 
the purchase of securities rated investment grade. But the most significant step 
towards the incorporation of ratings in prudential regulations has been made by the 
SEC in the mid-seventies of last century, with reference to the deduction of the 
assets necessary to calculate the capital requirements of broker-dealers (so-called 
haircut). 
Consider also that, according to SEC rules, the public offer and the 
admission to listing of a financial instrument are greatly simplified if you have a 
credit rating issued on that instrument, the agency registered as a National 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). Another important example 
in the U.S. system regards, finally, the limits for investment by mutual funds: for 
some types of funds, in fact, different investment thresholds are set according to the 
rating obtained from the securities purchased (for example, SEC Rule 2a-7 on 
money market funds), recently, the rule has been modified to some extent, but 
remains intact at the time the philosophy of reliance on credit ratings. Similar rules 
are provided for insurance. 
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The significant reliance of regulators on reviews of rating agencies is questionable 
whether this confidence is well placed, the phenomenon of referral to the rating by 
legislators and regulators is of course not only the United States: it has long been 
introduced to some other jurisdictions (Basel, 2000). One of the areas that were 
more slippery from this point of view is that of structured finance. 
 
THE RATINGS IN THE STRUCTURED FINANCE 
The structured finance anticipates some particularly delicate aspects, in great 
part already marked also to institutional level before the 2007 (Global Committee on 
the Financial System , 2008), than the crisis it has contributed to evidence. 
In the typical securitization scheme, the transfer of mortgages through SPV 
(special purpose vehicle) is financed through the issuance of bonds with different 
characteristics depending on the priority in repayment. The senior notes, with the 
right to reimbursement as a priority, are joined by junior securities, which suffered 
the first losses of the portfolio of mortgages and any approach for that reason, in 
equity securities. With reference to the senior notes shall be issued a credit rating 
high, sometimes at the highest level of the scale (AAA). In this context, interest in 
the issue of a rating as good as possible meets the preferences of all actors involved: 
the originator and the issuer, which in this way can raise funds at lower costs; 
investors, who may instead reduce the amount of capital that the prudential rules, as 
seen, require with regard to exposure to structured finance products. 
This commonality of interests is reflected in the allocation of credit ratings 
higher than the creditworthiness of the SPV would be justified. The mechanisms 
through which we come to this result are various: the most obvious are probably the 
"rating shopping" and the particular nature of the relationship between agencies and 
broadcasters during the structuring phase of emissions, these could be added 
according to some - but these are facts yet to be tested - including the release of false 
information to credit rating agencies by the originator. As to rating shopping, the 
availability of evaluation manuals adopted by the rating agencies seem to have led 
issuers to choose among the agencies in the field of structured finance, those who 
were able to ensure the highest vote on equal terms (Pagano and Volpin, 2010). 
As regards the relations between agencies and broadcasters in the previous 
step the issue of structured finance instruments, it was noted that the practice of 
continuously check the rating potential during the structuring of products has given 
rise, in essence, a form of disguised consulting with consequent impairment of the 
independence of agency proceedings, which seem to have given up on several 
occasions, a strict application of their valuation models giving better reviews than 
that such models would produce (Griffin and Yongjun Tang, 2009). 
Finally, with regard to the level of transparency of the issuer, is the recent 
news of the opening of an investigation by the attorney general of New York against 
eight major banks for the provision of false information to credit rating agencies in 
the structuring of financial products with the underlying loans as they were 
originators. 
The possibility for issuers to access the mathematical models adopted by the 
ratings agencies has meant that the first facility emissions and determine the 
underlying portfolios should be defined as (real or synthetic) starting from the 
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evaluation criteria selected by the second. In this context, the presence of errors and 
the inevitable simplifications of the models produce amplified effects not only 
because it is possible that a gap is consciously identified and exploited, but also 
because the process "backwards" (the rating of the product) increases the risk that 
the final decision has been influenced by this gap is what happened in particular 
with regard to the systematic underestimation by the rating model, the ratio of 
correlation between defaults on mortgages. 
The agencies have traditionally argued that the danger of an increase in the 
rating is offset by the risk of reputational damage in the event that the ratings prove, 
ex post, too benevolent. A significant number of defaults caused by securities 
classified as high credit would, in fact, the loss of trust in the goodness of the 
analysis of the agencies, which would lose its most valuable asset: its reputation. 
However, it was noted not only that the reputational damage it can at best be a threat 
in the medium long term - and do not represent a credible threat for people looking 
for immediate profits - but also that the reference to credit ratings by regulators, 
quite resilient in the face of doubts about the reliability of ratings agencies, is in fact 
a guarantee of future earnings reasonably safe. 
 
THE REFORMS OF U.S. NRSRO`s 
The low resistance of the judgments on the credit during the recent financial 
crisis has led many of the legislators and regulators to toughen the rules on rating 
agencies or, where none exist, to introduce new ones. 
Already in the seventies in the U.S. there is a register, maintained by the 
SEC, where the rating agencies are recognized (these are the already mentioned 
NRSRO). However, registration does not involve any activities subject to (unlike, as 
we shall see, the European system): on the contrary, membership of an agency is 
required to ensure that the list of NRSRO assessments issued are valid for the 
purposes of rules that incorporate a reference to credit ratings, for example in order 
to determine which financial products are fit to be the subject of investment by some 
people. 
In order to improve the quality of ratings, was enacted in 2006, Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act, which introduced a new section (15E) to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The implementing provisions of the new legislation have 
been enacted by the SEC at the end of June 2007. The main motivation behind the 
changes is the opacity that had characterized the process of evaluating applications 
for admission for enrollment in the previous system SEC (White, 2006). The 
standards of 2006 therefore provide more specific criteria for admission and 
enrollment, particularly the obligation to adopt policies for managing conflicts of 
interest. They are also prohibited certain conduct that might compromise the 
independence of the assessment agencies. For example, they cannot condition the 
issuance of a rating prior to the purchase of other services by the issuer or affiliated 
entities or condition the issuance of a financial instrument rating on the fact that it 
produced an opinion even on goods the underlying financial instrument. 
In November 2009, the SEC, in light of the crisis, has enacted some 
measures to further reduce the effects of conflicts of interest in connection with the 
issuance of CDOs and other similar instruments. In particular, it is expected that the 
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issuer of such instruments to make available to rating agencies other than that 
evaluated the financial instruments on the issue all the necessary information so they 
can proceed during the life of the financial instrument to issue assessments free of 
conflicts of interest. 
On the subject of rules of conduct and governance of rating agencies has 
returned the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(hereinafter called Dodd-Frank Act), which among other things, required the 
NRSRO to have a board of directors comprising at least half of independent 
directors (some of whom are users of credit ratings), called to monitor the policies 
management of conflicts of interest mentioned above and check the correctness of 
the procedures for developing the assessments issued by the agency and the 
effectiveness of internal controls (Sec. 932). 
 
THE THIRD BASEL AGREEMENT 
The American response to the crisis has been, at least until today, a 
tightening of rules for the prevention of conflicts of interest. In a similar direction 
moved the partial review – still underway – the Basel 2 agreement. 
In July 2009 the Basel Committee published a document containing 
amendments to the existing agreement about the relationship between ratings and 
securitizations, especially with regard to re-securitization (Basel, 2009). 
Between the fixes provided that banks are expected to integrate external 
rating with their own assessments of credit risk, with the consequent necessity – 
worth the full deduction of exposure from own funds – to obtain adequate 
information on the underlying investment. 
In December 2009 moreover a document is published for the consultation in 
which the main defects of the current agreement are found and some consequent 
modifications are proposed (Basel, 2009). 
The consultation proposes some corrective action on the matter of credit 
ratings, without major changes to the setting of the previous agreement. The 
document points out, for example, that the system of Basel 2 may have resulted in 
an over-reliance on external ratings, which seems to have led in some cases, the 
waiver by the banks, to make independent assessments on exposures taken from 
them: it was therefore proposed to include in the text of Basel is a specific duty to 
assess their exposures, they are subject to a credit rating or not. 
Leaving aside the more technical information, another significant aspect of 
the Basel Committee's proposals concerning the need for rating agencies, for valid 
judgments can be issued for the purposes of prudential regulation, comply with the 
IOSCO Code of Conduct (the major agencies Ratings are also largely aligned with 
the Code, with the exception of some deviations, although significant). 
 
THE TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Along the same path of strengthening the quality rating is Regulation (EC) 
No 1060/2009 ("concerning credit rating agencies"). Although the CESR and ESME 
(the European Securities Markets Expert Group) had excluded the group need to 
provide for a Community regulation on rating agencies, regulation 1060/2009 has 
imposed rules of conduct for such parties. 
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The mainstay of the discipline of regulation is the obligation of registration 
(art. 14), which are subjected to all those who wish to carry out professional activity 
on the credit rating issued (art. 3 (1) (b)), where judgments issued are published (or 
distributed on a subscription basis – art. 2 (1)). Registration under regulation, 
moreover, does not replace the proceedings recognition of rating agencies already 
prescribed by other provisions (art. 4): in essence, the recording will be a 
prerequisite for the recognition of other regulatory purposes (e.g., the so-called 
ECAI - The External Credit Assessment Institutions for the purposes of Basel 2). 
Among the rules applicable to registered persons deserve to be mentioned at 
least the following: 
¾ Are made for measures to prevent conflicts of interest (Articles 6 and 7), 
including: (i) the requirement to have at least one third of independent directors (in 
charge-controlling policy development rating, the internal controls and procedures 
for managing conflicts of interest, the smaller agencies may be exempted on request 
if they demonstrate that the principals are out of proportion), (ii) the prohibition of 
providing advice and recommendations to entities subject to ratings; (iii) the 
prohibition for employees to purchase securities issued or guaranteed by entities 
subject to rating, (iv) the prohibition to anticipate the likely future outcome of the 
rating if not rated entity, (v) inclusion of the cooling-off period for employees; 
¾ The agencies will be required to take measures of transparency about 
conflicts of interest (art. 6), including the publication of names of entities from 
which it derives more than 5% of annual turnover; 
¾ must be disclosed in certain elements of the methods and models assessment 
adopted (art. 8), for example, assumptions or mathematical correlation; 
¾ Is expected that a rating agency cannot refuse to issue an opinion on a 
derivative financial instrument because an underlying instrument has been assessed 
by another agency (art. 8); 
¾ The rating agencies are required to be reviewed regularly (at least once year) 
the judgments of courts and the methodologies used (art. 8); 
¾ Are prohibited selective disclosure of credit ratings (art. 10); 
¾ The agencies are required to comply with criteria of fairness in the 
presentation of opinions (Article 10), including: identify the source of the 
information obtained and methodologies; report any limitations in the information 
underlying the rating and, if absence of reliable data or too complex financial 
instruments, giving the issue of the trial; provide a sensitivity analysis of credit 
ratings, communicate to the assessment made at least twelve hours before the 
release, the issuer, so that they may indicate any factual errors; 
¾ Must be met certain requirements for regularly informing the public (art. 11 
and 12), including the obligation to communicate the historical data of default for 
each rating category, the remuneration policies adopted by the agency; Conflicts of 
interests are detected and the list of top twenty clients and customers whose 
contribution to turnover has increased significantly over the past year, a description 
of ownership, a description of the system of internal control; 
¾ Are then provided for periodic reporting obligations to the CESR (Article 
11), including the right to disclose data on the frequency of transition between the 
classes of credit ratings. 
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It has been strengthened supervision by national authorities, now have the 
power to adopt specific supervisory measures (Article 24). The incorporation of 
certain provisions of Regulation 1060/2009 is the subject of Community law in 2009 
finally approved in May 12, 2010. It is also a structure intended to be revised in the 
near future: in line with the proposals for reform of the authorities submitted in 
September and October 2009, 2 June 2010 the European Commission presented a 
proposal for amendment that assigns ESMA the responsibility for registration of 
rating agencies and the power to apply measures of supervision and require the 
application of sanctions by the European Commission (Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of The Council on amending Regulation, 2010).  
The national authorities, as well as to cooperate with the ESMA in carrying 
out its functions - some of which, especially in supervisory information may be 
delegated to them - will then be empowered to monitor the use of ratings by subjects 
who are required refer to them (banks, insurance companies and, as proposed by the 
European Commission, AIF). 
The same draft also suggests making arrangements for sharing, among the 
only rating agency, confidential information disclosed by the issuer on issue of 
structured financial products. The system is specifically inspired by similar 
provisions recently introduced by the SEC, for fear of discipline differences on these 




The ratings will most likely respond to an inevitable need to simplify the 
cognitive and, therefore, continue to have its own market. The actions of 
policymakers can be directed at improving this market - not necessarily in an 
alternative way - to eliminate the interference, which have artificially increased the 
demand for reviews on credit. 
In deciding what measures to take, you should keep in mind that ratings are 
just one among cognitive simplification tools available. In the recent crisis, this 
system has shown some shortcomings. First, the evaluation models adopted may 
contain errors, as demonstrated by the large underestimation of the correlation of 
defaults in the mortgage industry real estate ("static defect"): it is always possible 
that a fact not expected to happen or not there is a correlation properly weighted, the 
risk of imperfections in the models is and will always be present. It is therefore 
advisable not to delude ourselves about the possibility that a more stringent 
regulation will be able to prevent the emergence of problems in the future, in this as 
in other areas: a sensible approach for regulators may be to not delude themselves by 
imagining rating infallible, thereby increasing the expectation gap from which they 
were afflicted ratings agencies.  
Secondly, the risk rating classes are necessarily imprecise because 
adjustments cannot be made in real time (and, in General, the agencies try to prevent 
their judgments are subject to excessive volatility): will therefore always at least one 
rating, at that given moment does not correspond to the characteristics of the issuer 
but has not yet been updated and is not, therefore, a fully reliable indication 
("imperfection Dynamics"). 
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In these respects, inevitably linked to the difficult art of perspective 
valuations, you add the pitfalls arising from the particular configuration of rating. In 
the case of structured finance, the direct relationship between agencies and issuing 
the communication models of assessment or, in some cases, the granting of advice 
implied in the definition of emissions. This approach increases the risk of being 
exploited – not necessarily so aware – gaps of valuation models. 
With reference to structured finance, the risk of unjustifiably high valuation 
is then enhanced by the fact that the interest of issuers, investors and agencies is in 
the way of assigning a rating high: otherwise, the first might not be able to sell 
products, the second does not charge any Commission and, finally, the third parties 
may have to fall back on by lower investment yields. 
It is likely that the need for cognitive simplification that leads to use 
synthetic indicators also relates to regulators and policymakers, who have used the 
rating because it was the easiest way available to indicate the levels of risk of 
liability for regulatory purposes. However, the court not only an improper 
imprimatur on ratings and accentuates the value of a high credit rating and thus 
exacerbate the conflicts of interest. Therefore, to impose regulation based 
evaluations rating amplifies the inaccuracies (dynamic and static) from which they 
suffer. For the future, it seems appropriate to revise this approach. In the case of 
trusts, you may wish to consider whether to delete references to credit ratings, but 
does not prohibit the use of this indicator: it could be more appropriate to increase 
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